1The US Treasury, the government’s finance department, borrows by selling bonds, which are loans to the government.
2It is also buying some long-term bonds back early. Many think the aim is lower long-term interest rates.
3The Fed, the central bank, sets rates. Nobody has agreed the Treasury may steer them too. We call this the question.
4On 4 November 2026 the Treasury says what it will sell next, and why. We gave it three plans and simulated the eight weeks before, 15 runs per plan.
5Fed officials raised the question in speeches. In the 30 runs with no extra spending, it came into the open in 4.
6In the plan where the Treasury spent an extra $40bn on buybacks, it came into the open in 10 of 15 runs.
7So who makes the Treasury admit the aim? Nobody. Admitting it is a plan the Treasury chooses.
8We wrote the rules, including how much trust each reason costs the Treasury. Admitting the aim cost most because our rules charge it most.
How the simulation works
Seven roles and five turns, 9 September to 4 November. Each turn a role tries a move, and chance decides.
Each run had the same chances under all three plans, so the plans compare move for move.
Plan 1Keep its current wording.
Plan 2Sell fewer long-term bonds and cite “structural demand”, a lasting change in who buys bonds.
Plan 3Sell fewer and admit it wants lower rates. In October it also spends an extra $40bn on buybacks, an amount we chose.
Our rules let traders bet against the Treasury only after it spends that extra money, or once the question is open. Speeches could open the question without the money, at odds we chose.
Real facts stop on 3 September 2026. After that it is the simulation’s story, not a forecast.
The players
The TreasuryPicks what to sell on 4 November, and gives the reason.
The Fed presidentsThree regional heads of the Fed. They ask the question out loud.
Hedge funds and dealersBond traders who bet against the Treasury if they think it is holding rates down on purpose.
The Fed BoardThe Fed’s chair and governors. They set short-term rates and stay silent on long-term ones.
Three morePensions and insurers, money funds and stablecoins (digital dollar tokens), and foreign governments, mainly Japan.
The numbers
The claim, 45 runs, five turnsFig. 1
Without extra spending, the question opened in 4 of 30 runs. After the $40bn, it opened in 10 of 15. What each reason costs is a charge we chose.
The middle run at the start and at the end of each turn, on two scales of 0 to 100.
Line
Start
Turn 1
Turn 2
Turn 3
Turn 4
Turn 5
How openly the aim is discussed, 0 to 100: no extra spending
15
15
26
35
42
How openly the aim is discussed, 0 to 100: $40bn drawn
15
15
26
54
67
Trust in the Treasury, 0 to 100: kept wording
70
68
66
64
62
63
Trust in the Treasury, 0 to 100: cited demand
70
68
66
64
62
53
Trust in the Treasury, 0 to 100: admitted aim
70
68
66
60
54
36
Scales we wrote, 0 to 100. Cyan: Plan 3, the only plan that drew the extra $40bn. Simulation record.
What it means
While spending the extra money, before giving any reason, Plan 3 lost 7 points more than the others. When the reason was given, Plan 3 lost 18 and Plan 2 lost 8, mostly our charge for the reason: usually 15 for admitting the aim, 6 for “structural demand”.
In 11 of Plan 2’s twelve runs the market believed “structural demand”.
Our judgement, beyond what we tested: a reason nobody can check works only while people believe it.
The line
Without extra money, speeches landed in 24 of 30 runs and forced the question open in 4. After an extra $40bn, it opened in 10 of 15.