
The Quiet Discount
Business software is sold one licence per person, and AI agents now do those people's work. When does the price reset, and who pays?
Dr Dan Epstein · v0.10 · 2026-10-12
A Strategy Soup ScenarioWhat is an exercised scenario?
The question
Most business software is sold per seat. A seat is a licence for one named person, billed monthly or yearly, so the bill tracks head count. AI agents, meaning software that carries out a multi-step task on its own, cut the cost of the work those people did. The bill and the work have come apart. So when does the price get reset, and who pays for the reset?
The usual forecast is that the seat is dead and usage pricing wins. Usage pricing means charging for how much work the software does, in messages, actions or credits, instead of for how many people can log in. Two prices matter here. The list price is the number the vendor publishes. The price actually paid is what one customer hands over after discounts, credits and private side agreements. That second number is confidential, and this report calls the gap between them the secret.
Our answer: the runs track no prices, so they cannot say when the price resets. What they count is whether the secret became public while the incumbent vendor, the large software company in the simulation, still had renewals to defend. Every large player had a reason to keep it.
In 62 of the hundred re-runs described below, the secret was kept to mid-2030, when the runs end. In the other 38 it came out. In 16 a customer published what it really paid. In 26 a buyer publicly called out the incumbent vendor's rename, the AI label it put on the product it already sold instead of cutting the price, and four re-runs had both. We count the call-out because it tells every other buyer that the list price is not what customers pay, though it reveals no price. Neither customer is one of the four players below: each is an event the rules fire when the AI-native challenger's price move lands very well or the incumbent vendor's rename fails badly.
The usual framing, seat pricing against usage pricing, moved the incumbent vendor's score less in the runs than the secret did. The timeline below follows the less common branch, where a customer publishes its real price, and places that in 2029, a date we chose for the story. In the re-runs it usually came earlier, 25 of the 38 by mid-2028.
Who pays? In the re-runs, the incumbent vendor loses a little and the corporate buyer gains. Each player carries a score for its strength in the market, on a scale we chose. The incumbent vendor starts at 100, zero means out of the market, and its worst single move costs it six points. The incumbent vendor's median score, the middle of its hundred results, fell from 100 to 95, while the corporate buyer's rose from 70 to 79.
The incumbent vendor lost more where the secret ended: a median of 92 in the 38 re-runs where the secret came out, against 99 in the 62 where it was kept. The simulation has one buyer among its players, the corporate buyer, so it cannot show which buyers gain least. Our judgement, beyond what it tested, is that the buyers who renew knowing least about what others pay get the smallest discounts.
Where a reset does arrive, our reading, which the simulation never tested, is that it looks like hybrid pricing: the seat kept for the people who still log in, the agents' work billed by the action.
How the simulation works. This report is about a simulation, a structured argument played under rules: each player has a role, a goal and a menu of moves. Chance decided each move, with odds set by the simulation's rules. The live run, in which each player chose its own moves and gave its reasons, lasted five half-year turns, from late 2026 to the end of 2028.
A second, rule-based version of the same simulation then ran one hundred times over all eight half-years to mid-2030. Each player picks its moves by fixed rules with weighted chance, so only the chance draws change from one run to the next. One complete play-through is a world, or a re-run, and the hundred together are the ensemble. This version moves each player's score up or down after every turn. Nobody measured the starting scores: the incumbent vendor 100, the corporate buyer 70, the integrator 60, the AI-native challenger 30. Dan Epstein set the question. The last three half-years, 2029 H1 to 2030 H1, are written from the re-runs, because the live run stopped at the end of 2028.
Four players, each named by what it does. The incumbent vendor, a very large software company whose income is mostly per-user licences. The AI-native challenger, a smaller rival that charges per job completed rather than per user. The corporate buyer, a large company whose finance chief pays for licences nobody logs into. The integrator, a global consulting firm paid to install and connect enterprise software.
A beat is one dated section of the timeline below. A number with a bracketed marker, like , is a real-world fact checked against the evidence pack at the back. Every other number is the simulation's own record or a figure we chose, and the sentence says which.
This version is dated 12 October 2026. The real-world facts in it stop in August 2026, when the sources were last checked. Everything dated after that is the simulation's story, written as a memory from 2030 looking back. It is not a forecast. Some of its early dates have now passed, and we have not checked them against what really happened.
2026 H2
The rename survives
The half-year dates on these headings are the simulation's own calendar, which we chose. The first five beats follow the players, not the clock: the live run's five turns span 2026 H2 to 2028 H2, and each beat tells one player's moves across them. The fourth also uses one event from the re-runs, the failed pilot. The last three beats come from the re-runs. The incumbent vendor opened with the rename, and it worked, because everything it gave away it gave away in private.
Two large customers had run agent trials, meaning tests of whether an AI agent could do a real job before they paid for it. The trials showed one workflow needing half as many licences. The incumbent vendor renewed both at full list price before they could use that finding to argue for a discount. In exchange it handed over concessions that never appear on an invoice: a better support tier, a delay on the bill for using the software beyond the contract, and a renamed "agent-inclusive" package. Nothing was announced. The move worked four turns running, then missed on the fifth.
The real market goes further than the simulation here. A vendor harvesting a seat model, taking as much revenue from it as it can before it ends, lifts the published number and gives the real price away underneath it, one renewal at a time, so every private discount is measured from a higher start. Salesforce, whose business is per-person licences, raised its list price by an average of 6 per cent across its Enterprise and Unlimited editions, effective August 2025, while shipping agents into every product . That rise is the harvest move made in public. Salesforce sells its agents two ways at once: at US$2 per conversation, an option still on its price list , and through prepaid credits that work out at roughly ten US cents an action . The best-known per-seat AI product is Microsoft 365 Copilot, at US$30 per user per month . Microsoft also sells agents at a penny a credit . Both real vendors run both models at once and let each renewal decide which applies, in private.
The incumbent vendor knew what it was building. Listing its assumptions on the opening move, the player wrote: "Confidentiality of the side-letter terms is not perfectly enforceable" (incumbent vendor, turn 0). A side letter is a private agreement attached to a contract, changing the terms without changing the price list. The incumbent vendor went ahead. Its own assumptions said it was "knowingly trading a near-term revenue/logo win for continued non-resolution of the public pricing question" (incumbent vendor, turn 0).
The live run's referee, which the transcript calls the arbiter, called the move "orthogonal to the actual battlefield" (arbiter, turn 0), by which it meant public, provable pricing based on results. The move worked regardless.
2027 H1
The challenger publishes maths nobody signs
The AI-native challenger's plan was to publish a price comparison and get one flagship customer, meaning a large and well-known buyer, to put its name to it. It published five times. No customer ever signed.
The move: publish a sheet setting the AI-native challenger's outcome pricing against what the corporate buyer spends on per-seat licences, with the cost of unused licences as the difference. Outcome pricing means charging only when the software finishes the job. It is real and cheap to point at: one live agent charges 99 US cents only when it resolves a support ticket .
Publishing needs a large customer willing to be named, and every force at the table pushed against that: the risk to the buyer's own job if the deal goes badly, the incumbent vendor's private counter-offer arriving within days, and the habit of the buying department, called procurement, of using its bargaining power in private.
The AI-native challenger put its own odds at 38 to 52 per cent, and all five attempts missed. A rule in the live run made each repeat of a move harder to land than the last. We call this rule repetition fatigue. The AI-native challenger had the diagnosis a turn later: "the brief itself lands, the logo commitment is the harder ask" (AI-native challenger, turn 4).
The pool of real challengers is thinner than vendor claims suggest. Of the thousands of vendors claiming to sell AI agents in 2025, Gartner estimated only about 130 were real. It named the rebranding of chatbots and screen-automation software "agent washing" . In the simulation, every fake challenger that failed in public made the real one's pitch harder to believe.
2027 H2
The audit that never becomes an invoice
An audit here means counting licences to find the ones nobody uses. The corporate buyer ran that count, found the waste, then kept the finding to itself.
The simulation has built-in events, meaning things we scripted to happen regardless of what the players chose. In the live run's last turn, one put unused licences at 40 per cent of those paid for, measured as no login in 90 days. One industry index says reality is worse. Zylo, which tracks software spending for its customers, found the average organisation in its 2026 index used 54 per cent of its software licences, so 46 per cent sat unused, wasting about US$19.8 million a year for that average organisation . We assume that average covers companies large enough to pay someone to track licences, so the dollar figure is a large-company average.
On its third turn the corporate buyer set out to switch off unused licences and bank quick savings before any renegotiation. Publishing the finding would give every other buyer a number to point at, and that helps the market. Keeping it private makes it bargaining power at this renewal, for this finance chief's own bonus. That last clause is a modelling assumption: we gave the corporate buyer a personal reason to prefer the private number, because buying teams are usually paid on this year's savings. Buyer and vendor are opponents on paper, and both wanted the real price kept private.
The third audit was harder to land because it repeated the first two, and it still worked. The referee warned that the audit risked showing the corporate buyer "treading water instead of converting prior audit findings into the vendor renegotiation it keeps deferring" (arbiter, turn 2). For four turns the corporate buyer kept finding the same waste and never used it to force a better contract. The fourth audit failed badly, the only bad failure in the live run.
The fifth attempt is the one to copy. The corporate buyer stopped auditing and forced a true-up on its largest per-seat contract, and it landed. A true-up resets a contract to the licences actually used, with money moving to match. The evidence was the same. This time the number had an invoice attached.
2028 H1
The pilots crash into the trough
A pilot is the same thing as the agent trials above: a small test of new software on real work before a full rollout. The trough is the slump after the hype, when those tests fail and budgets get cut. The repricing argument assumes agents work, and in 2025 most did not.
MIT's Project NANDA found 95 per cent of organisations seeing no business return on generative AI, against US$30 to 40 billion of enterprise spending . Gartner forecast that over 40 per cent of agentic AI projects would be cancelled by the end of 2027, blaming rising costs, unclear business value or weak risk controls .
The most famous case of an agent replacing staff ran its arc in fifteen months. Klarna announced its assistant was doing the work of 700 full-time customer service staff and put a US$40 million profit improvement on it . Then it reversed, resumed hiring people, and its chief executive conceded that when cost is the main test, "what you end up having is lower quality" .
The rule-based version has this as a named event, the burned pilot: a failed trial that resets trust in agents inside the buyer and hands the incumbent vendor another year. It fired in 12 of the hundred re-runs. The incumbent vendor's renewal staff never had to argue that agents will never work, only that this renewal is not the place to bet the workflow.
2028 H2
The integrator sells the fog
The fog is the confusion about which pricing model will win. A systems integrator is a consulting firm paid to install and connect enterprise software. The integrator in the simulation is one, and it spent the whole run staying neutral and selling that confusion, because an unsettled market keeps paying for advice.
A vendor-neutral scope of work here, a shared cost baseline there, positioned as the layer under whichever pricing model won. The integrator ran that move five times, and each repeat was harder to land, as it was for the AI-native challenger. The first two hedges missed, the middle two landed, and the fifth missed.
The fifth hedge was the same offer, made in public for the first time. The integrator said the broken layer was per-seat licensing and its own implementation work was sound, and again offered to build the repricing framework for whichever player won. The referee ruled that the integrator was offering to cooperate with the incumbent vendor while calling the incumbent vendor's model structurally flawed, "a real tension the proponent did not surface or address" (arbiter, turn 4).
2029 H1
The spend rises while the seats die
If the seat were dying the way the usual forecast claims, the software line in company accounts would shrink. It grew. Worldwide software spending grew 11.9 per cent in 2025 to US$1.24 trillion, and was forecast to grow another 15.2 per cent in 2026 . An analyst at Gartner, a research firm that tracks the technology industry, said why. AI features built into the software companies already own are pushing its cost up .
The unit the vendor charges for is collapsing. In one 2026 survey of 230 business software and AI companies, three in four had changed their pricing or packaging inside a year. In the same sample, hybrid pricing, meaning seats and usage sold to the same customer at once, went from 25 to 37 per cent adoption in twelve months, and AI-credit schemes grew 126 per cent year on year . The seat is being replaced by a menu of seats, credits, actions and outcomes. That menu makes the price one buyer pays impossible to compare with the price another pays, and a market that cannot compare prices cannot reset them.
Our reading is that hybrid pricing is how the reset arrives. The vendor reprices the work one contract at a time and barely moves the list price, so a hybrid contract belongs to Ending A below and never forces Ending C. Neither version of the simulation contains such a move. The rule-based version's only usage-shaped move for the incumbent vendor is the pure pivot the forced fork tests, and in the live run the integrator named hybrid once, in turn 4, as one of three models its neutral framework would serve. So the players never tried the reset the survey says the market is choosing.
In our telling, the incumbent vendor's list price has not moved in six half-years, while the price its customers actually pay has fallen throughout. The figure under Ending A draws those two curves by hand.
2029 H2
The reference price goes public
A reference price is a price one customer paid that other customers can point at, and it exists only once it is public. In this beat one customer publishes what it really pays and what switching to a rival would cost. That is the end of the secret. In the re-runs where the secret ended, a customer or a buyer ended it.
The pressure builds by accumulation. Every private side letter is a document somebody can leak, and every audit is a number some board member has seen. One built-in event is an analyst story naming seat collapse as the risk of the year, which lowers the career risk of publishing first. In our telling, the customer who breaks first is a large, well-known buyer already on its way out of the relationship.
The rule-based version's event for this move fired in 16 of the hundred re-runs. We wrote it in, and placed it in 2029, because it is the branch that changes what a vendor or a buyer should do next.
One published customer reprices nothing by itself, but it gives every other buyer a real price to quote at the next negotiation. Before, the incumbent vendor's renewal conversations opened at the list price and discounted down in private. Now they opened at the real price that customer had published, and argued upward. Same contracts, same product.
2030 H1
The harvest ends on the buyer's terms
The window closes on a settlement. The incumbent vendor's harvest ends because buyers gather enough information to end it, and no rival beat the incumbent vendor.
In our telling, the seats that survived are welded to work agents cannot do. The rest of the incumbent vendor's estate has been repriced through credits, bundles and true-ups, almost none of it through the list price. The repricing landed where the bargaining power sat at each renewal, unevenly and in private.
The AI-native challenger was driven out in none of the hundred re-runs. In our telling it ends small and important: the outside option that disciplined every renewal it never won. The corporate buyer's licence bill is smaller, but not by as much as its audits had predicted. The integrator sold the transition and owns what it built before the question settled.
Against their 2026 H2 starting scores, the median re-run ends with the incumbent vendor at 95 from 100, the corporate buyer at 79 from 70, the integrator at 63 from 60, and the AI-native challenger at 36 from 30. Each is that player's own median across the hundred. The corporate buyer gained the most points, nine. The AI-native challenger gained the most in proportion, a fifth, and is still the smallest player. The incumbent vendor lost five. No player was driven out, and none took over the market. In this telling the seat survives and the secret ends. In the re-runs the seat survived in all hundred, and the secret survived in 62.
our telling, not the re-runs, over eight half-years: no ring for the first six, one ring in the seventh when the first customer publishes its real price, then four in the eighth for the customers that follow
One hundred worlds
One run is an anecdote, so we ran the rule-based version one hundred times: same roles, same menu of moves, different chance draws.
The incumbent vendor's final score runs from 82 at the 5th percentile to 112 at the 95th, with a median of 95 against a start of 100. The worst single world ended on 72 and the best on 121. No run drove the incumbent vendor out of the market inside the window. The figure beside this section draws a narrower band: at each half-year, the middle 80 of the hundred runs.
The hundred divide two ways: by the secret, and by how the incumbent vendor kept its price. A clustering program, which sorts runs by the moves each player made and when, found six groups. Each group is named by the move the incumbent vendor made most in it, and only two names came up: the rename with the list price kept (33, 20, 11 and 8 worlds), and multi-year lock-ins (17 and 11 worlds). So 72 worlds keep the price mainly by the rename and 28 mainly by early lock-ins, a lock-in being a multi-year contract that stops the customer repricing until it ends. The groups are weak: the runs differ by degree more than by kind, so treat 72 and 28 as a rough sort. The two divisions cut across each other. Of the 72 rename worlds, 44 kept the secret, and of the 28 lock-in worlds, 18 did.
The outcomes that should worry a vendor sit in the tail, where lock-ins fail early and the secret comes out early.
The forced fork
A forced fork is a change we made on purpose, in every world, to test one decision: should the incumbent vendor cut its own licence revenue early and switch to usage pricing before the AI-native challenger forces it?
So we made the incumbent vendor do exactly that, in all one hundred worlds, at the start of 2027, the second of the eight half-years. We then compared each world against its own baseline: the same world, run with the same chances, and the incumbent vendor left to its usual moves, the rename and lock-ins. Left alone, the incumbent vendor switched to usage pricing in only 2 of the 100.
The bold move loses more often than it wins. The baseline beat the early switch in 57 of the 100 pairs of runs with the same chances. The early switch won 39, and 4 tied. The median cost of switching early was one point of the incumbent vendor's final score. The downside was larger than the upside: the middle half of worlds ranged from seven points worse to two points better.
The simulation's odds for a usage switch are built from the same pilot-failure rates the evidence lists , . If you believe your organisation beats those rates, the early switch looks better. The secret moved the incumbent vendor's median score by seven points, against one for timing. Part of that gap is built in, because a buyer calling out the rename is the incumbent vendor's rename failing badly, which costs it four points. Even so, how long the secret was kept moved the incumbent vendor's score more than when it switched.
Where it forks - pick your ending
The timeline followed a branch that is not the most common one: in 84 re-runs no customer published its real price. The three endings below are our stories, built on the re-run counts, and they do not divide the hundred into three slices. Endings A and C split the hundred by the secret. Ending B cuts across that split: 18 of its 28 re-runs kept the secret. A count of runs says nothing about the odds in the real world.
Where it forks - pick your ending
Ending A - The secret survives and the price falls anyway
The rename does its job for the whole window. Every renewal is defended one account at a time, with credits, bundles and side letters, and never a price anyone outside the deal can see. In our telling, the price customers actually pay falls hard and the list price barely moves. The secret survived to mid-2030 in 62 of the hundred re-runs, the most common result.
We assume benchmarking co-operatives, member groups that pool what each member really paid, already run for business software. That makes a weak price record, a pool of real paid prices a buyer can see: members only, anonymised, months behind, never quoted in public. We checked no named co-operative.
What it looks like: vendor revenue stays level while the margin on each unit of work falls. Renewal cycles lengthen, discount approvals move up the chain, and the pricing page stops meaning anything. Buyers with good internal data do well at the expense of buyers without it.
Load-bearing assumption: the private discount is always worth more to the buyer who keeps it than the real price is to the market once it is public. That stayed true because every player had a private reason to stay quiet. It fails the moment publishing starts to help the career of the person who publishes. A benchmarking co-operative that quoted its pool in public, a procurement co-op that bought as one, or a regulator asking for effective rates would each do that.
Where it forks - pick your ending
Ending B - The repricing arrives after the contract ends
The incumbent vendor gets multi-year signatures in early, before the agent evidence hardens into a bargaining position, so the repricing lands after the term rather than during it. The incumbent vendor kept its price mainly by lock-ins in 28 of the hundred re-runs. It is the same harvest as Ending A. The incumbent vendor gets certainty and gives up flexibility, and the buyer gives up a year of bargaining power for a discount it will regret.
What it looks like: a wave of three-year and five-year agreements signed in 2026 and 2027 close to list price, then a much uglier renewal round in 2029 and 2030, when the evidence arrives all at once instead of quarterly.
Load-bearing assumption: buyers sign multi-year deals at exactly the moment their own trial data says they should not. The live run fits it: the corporate buyer audited four times before it forced its first true-up, on the fifth turn. It is also the ending most exposed to one competent procurement team. In 14 of the hundred re-runs a lock-in push failed badly, which the rule-based version scores as a buyer revolt.
Where it forks - pick your ending
Ending C - A customer publishes early
A flagship customer publishes what it really pays and what switching to a rival would cost, years ahead of the schedule above, or a buyer calls out the rename in public. Every renewal conversation after that opens from the real price that customer paid, instead of from the list price. Together the two events happened in 38 of the hundred re-runs, 25 of them by mid-2028. Some customers move to the published price and most do not: a buyer that can point at a published price moves.
What it looks like: one document, then four more inside two quarters, then a market where the discount is the starting point rather than the concession. The list price moves last, and as a formality.
Load-bearing assumption: one flagship customer's reputational gain from publishing exceeds its relationship cost, while the incumbent vendor still has renewals to defend. That needs a specific buyer at a specific moment: mid-divestment, mid-crisis, or already out the door. Without one, Ending C never fires and Ending A runs to 2030.
You are reading this in 2026
The renewal that decides which ending a vendor is walking toward is on somebody's desk now. It will be settled by email, in private, with no announcement.
Three things you can check today: Salesforce's list price is public and it went up 6 per cent while the agents shipped , one industry index puts unused licences at 46 per cent , and the agent failure rates are published and brutal , . This account rests on those three.
Watch a narrower number than the list price: the share of deals in your market that open from a real price some customer has published. We know of no public count of it. Our judgement is that it is close to zero today, which is why the rename works. The day it stops being close to zero, the timeline above compresses and every renewal conversation you have planned needs rewriting.
The seams - what we chose, what we wrote, and what this cannot settle
A seam is a place where this report could come apart.
One rule shaped the live run. The rule is repetition fatigue: each repeat of a move was harder to land than the last. By the third repeat every player's move was harder to land than at first, and none got easier again. The AI-native challenger fails with or without the rule: even its best try fell short of what its first attempt needed, before any repeat.
Three other misses came on repeats: the incumbent vendor's fifth move, the integrator's fifth hedge and the corporate buyer's fourth audit. The incumbent vendor's and the integrator's fifth tries would have landed at the odds of their first attempts, so the rule may have decided those two. The hundred re-runs, where the 62 and 38 come from, have no such rule. We kept it because a pitch the market has already declined does age badly. But we built that rule into the simulation, and nobody has verified it as a fact about markets.
Where a player got it plainly wrong, and we left the error in. The AI-native challenger misidentified who it was attacking. From its first move, it described its comparison sheet as exposing "Meridian's incumbent pricing" (AI-native challenger, turn 0). Meridian is the transcript's name for the corporate buyer. The incumbent vendor sells the seats. The referee did not catch the error and built on it. At turn 0 it ruled that the real risk was whether the deal survived "Meridian's counter-offer window", a sentence about a company with no counter-offer to make. The slip recurs through turn 3. It did not change the outcome, because the AI-native challenger failed every attempt either way, but it went uncorrected for most of a five-turn run.
No player abandoned a losing move. Twenty moves were played, containing four distinct plays, one to a player. The incumbent vendor renamed and discounted in private five times, the AI-native challenger published five times, the integrator hedged five times, and the corporate buyer audited four times before converting the audit into a true-up. In turns 0 to 4 the incumbent vendor had four wins, then a miss. The AI-native challenger had five misses. The corporate buyer had three wins and a bad miss, then the true-up landed. The integrator had two misses, two wins, then a miss. We think real executives would have switched tactics sooner. Treat the live run first as evidence that the players in the live run carried a strategy past the point a real executive would have stopped.
"No run drove the incumbent vendor out" is partly a property of the board. The incumbent vendor starts the rule-based version at 100 and a player is eliminated at zero. The heaviest single loss any of its moves carries is six points, and the rival moves that take points from the leader take two to four more. Reaching zero inside eight half-years therefore needs close to worst-case chance draws on almost every turn, and the lowest final score across the hundred worlds was 72. "The incumbent vendor was never driven out" means only that eight half-years is not long enough to drive this incumbent vendor out on this board.
Where we wrote past the live run. The last three beats, 2029 H1 to 2030 H1, are written from the re-run counts. No player in the live run played them. The rule-based version does carry the customer-publishes event, which fired in 16 of the hundred re-runs, but the profile of who breaks first in 2029 H2 is our own synthesis, and so is its date. The two price curves under Ending A, and the side panel that tracks them on wide screens, are curves we drew to illustrate the story. They are not fitted to the runs, which track no prices. The recap at the foot reads three numbers off that illustration, a quarter, forty per cent and four more customers in six months, so those are ours too.
The players were not calibrated, and the sample is too small to say by how much. Calibration means whether a player's stated odds matched how often it succeeded. Where a player said 70 per cent or better, it succeeded twice out of two. Where it said 40 to 69 per cent, it succeeded 8 times out of 16. Where it said under 40 per cent, it failed both times. The least confident group never landed once, and every one of those claims was the AI-native challenger's. A player that talks itself down before chance decides is not the same thing as a market that says no.
What this report assumes and did not check. Three assumptions carry weight and have no source. The benchmarking co-operatives under Ending A exist and stay members only, anonymised and lagged. Zylo's index covers only companies large enough to pay for licence tracking, so its US$19.8 million a year is a large-company average. Hybrid pricing is the reset the real market is choosing, a reading no chance draw tested.
Where the evidence cuts against the scenario. First, Salesforce raised its list price by 6 per cent where the incumbent vendor held its flat, so the simulation understates how far list and paid can pull apart. Second, the simulation's unused-licence event is 40 per cent, milder than the 46 per cent in Zylo's index , which puts more pressure on the secret in reality than in the simulation. Third, if the pilot-failure rates , fall faster than the simulation's odds assumed, every beat here arrives early. The scenario's dates are the least defensible thing in it.
So what - picking your role
Pick which of the four players is closest to your own job, then run the simulation against that job.
If you sell licences: in 62 of the hundred re-runs the secret lasted to mid-2030, longer than the usual forecast claims, and that is the trap. Every private concession that wins a renewal adds a document, a number or a precedent to the pile that can go public later. Ask your next pricing meeting this. On the day the first flagship customer publishes what it really pays, which of our renewal conversations survives starting from that number?
If you are the challenger: the arithmetic only gets you into the room. Your real product is the first public signature. Pricing, guarantees, legal posture and choice of first customer all follow from what it takes for one flagship customer to survive publishing. Budget for the risk to the job of the person who signs.
If you buy software: publishing your audit helps every buyer in the market. Keeping it private helps you more at this quarter's renewal. The simulation kept reproducing that conflict between you and every other buyer, so decide your position in it on purpose. Before you push for repricing, reread the trough beat , . If you move first on a job your agents cannot actually do yet, you risk the public reversal Klarna had to make.
If you sell implementation: the confusion is a real product with a real expiry date. Sell the transition, but build the thing that survives the pricing question being settled, because on that day "neutral between models" is no longer something a client will pay for.
The simulation played this table once in the live run and re-ran it a hundred times. What it cannot do is put your own leadership team in the four roles and make them defend their assumptions out loud. That is the Workshop, a paid half-day session: your decision, your people, and someone whose job is to argue with the comfortable answer until it stands or falls over in a room instead of in the market.
Changelog
v0.10 - 19 October 2026. The method notes are gone, among them the byline credit, the account of how this report was made and the seams entry on who played. Who played and how is in the editorial policy. The seams heading and three of its entry titles are reworded to match. Chance now takes one plain line: chance decided each move, with odds set by the simulation's rules. The chance numbers of single moves and the marks they had to reach are cut. The findings that rested on them are reworded, and the two charts of those marks now show each player's own odds for each attempt. No result changed.
v0.10 - 12 October 2026. Revised after fresh readers read every depth. The opening now states the question and answers it: the runs track no prices, so the answer is whether the real price came out. The headline is one count: the secret was kept to mid-2030 in 62 of the hundred re-runs and came out in 38, and a customer published its real price in 16 of those. The opening says who pays, in scores, and what a score means. The endings say how they divide the re-runs. The first figure shows only re-run counts, and our illustrative price curves now sit under Ending A, labelled as ours. Four corrections. The corporate buyer's third audit was harder to land as a repeat, and the corporate buyer still landed it. The seams no longer say the AI-native challenger would have landed one attempt in five without the repetition-fatigue rule, because even its best try fell short of what its first attempt needed. The incumbent vendor left to its usual moves switched to usage pricing in only 2 of the 100 runs, where the text said it switched later under pressure. The corporate buyer made one true-up, on the fifth turn. The report speaks as "we" and uses "score" and "the rename" at every depth. On 14 October we cut repeated passages at every depth to bring each back to its length limit. Those cuts changed no number. On 19 October the forced fork took the words the scrolling pages use: each pair is two runs with the same chances. The players also took the names the scrolling pages use: the incumbent vendor, the AI-native challenger, the corporate buyer and the integrator. A quote keeps the transcript's words. No number changed.
v0.9 - 12 October 2026. The report calls its structured argument a simulation throughout, where earlier versions called it a "game".
v0.8 - 12 October 2026. Claims checked against the run record and the evidence pack. The incumbent vendor's reason for going ahead now quotes its own opening assumptions. Two claims the sources do not support are cut: that Salesforce has the most licences to harvest, and that the incumbent vendor's harvest ran longer than anyone expected. No number changed.
v0.7 - 12 October 2026. The two public events are now counted world by world: four worlds had both, so the real price goes public in 38 of the hundred, where this page said 26 to 42.
v0.6 - 9 September 2026. Benchmarking co-operatives named as the weak form of a price record, hybrid pricing named as the reset path, and Zylo's figure given its population. One figure we drew added under Ending A, list price against price paid, and a list of unsourced assumptions added to the seams.
v0.5 - 8 September 2026. The four roles are "players" throughout. Klarna's reversal and Salesforce's per-conversation price are dated as the sources say. Added from the run record: the incumbent vendor's chance draws, the twenty moves, the starting scores, and that no world drove the AI-native challenger out.
v0.4 - 6 September 2026. Plain-language rewrite of all three depths. Every pricing and simulation term is defined where it first appears. No number, date or source changed.
v0.3 - 5 September 2026. Prose edit. Added the paragraph on bracketed markers. One correction: the seams had said no player changed its mind, but the corporate buyer switched to a true-up.
v0.2 - 2 September 2026. Every number from the hundred worlds reproduced by re-running the simulation's code. Three endings and the "You are reading this in 2026" section added. The seams gained five entries, including the challenger mistaking the buyer for the vendor. One correction: the integrator's first two hedges failed, where v0.1 had the first succeeding.
v0.1 - 26 August 2026. First draft. Four players over a five-turn live run, then the rule-based version run one hundred times. Sixteen real-world claims in the evidence pack.
Sources
Every marker in the text resolves to a verified claim below. A claim marked * is true with a recorded caveat. Full provenance, verbatim quotes and retrieval dates live in the evidence pack (the-seat-price-v1).
| Id | Verified claim | Source |
|---|---|---|
| s-001 | Agentforce launched at US$2 per conversation. The option is still listed (pre-purchase) as of Aug 2026 | concret.io, 2026-08-04 |
| s-002 | Flex Credits: US$500 per 100,000 credits. A standard action consumes 20 credits (~US$0.10/action) | concret.io, 2026-08-04 |
| s-003 | Salesforce raised Enterprise/Unlimited list prices an average 6% effective 2025-08-01 | Reuters via Yahoo Finance, 2025-06-19 |
| s-004 | Microsoft 365 Copilot priced at US$30 per user per month | Microsoft official blog, 2023-07-18 |
| s-005 | Copilot Studio pay-as-you-go at US$0.01 per credit, or US$200/month for 25,000 prepaid | CloudZero, 2026 |
| s-006 | Klarna: assistant doing the equivalent work of 700 full-time agents | Klarna press release, 2024-02-27 |
| s-007 | Klarna: estimated US$40m profit improvement in 2024 | Klarna press release, 2024-02-27 |
| s-008 | Klarna CEO on the reversal: cost-first substitution produced "lower quality" | Fortune, 2025-05-09 |
| s-009 | Average organisation uses 54% of SaaS licences, with ~US$19.8m/year wasted on unused licences | Zylo SaaS Management Index, 2026 |
| s-010 | Gartner: over 40% of agentic AI projects cancelled by end-2027 (costs, value, risk controls) | Gartner press release, 2025-06-25 |
| s-011 | Gartner: only ~130 of thousands of agentic AI vendors are real, "agent washing" | Gartner press release, 2025-06-25 |
| s-012 | MIT NANDA: 95% of organisations seeing no return on US$30-40bn of GenAI spend | MIT NANDA via Virtualization Review, 2025-08-19 |
| s-013 | Worldwide software spending: +11.9% (2025, US$1.24tn), forecast +15.2% (2026, US$1.43tn) | Gartner forecast, 2025-10-22 |
| s-014 | Gartner analyst: GenAI is pushing the cost of software up | Gartner forecast, 2025-10-22 |
| s-015 | Intercom Fin: US$0.99 per resolved outcome | Intercom pricing page, retrieved 2026-08-26 |
| s-016 | Hybrid pricing 25%→37% in 12 months, AI-credit models +126% YoY, 3 in 4 changed pricing in a year | Growth Unhinged survey (n=230), 2026-05-13 |